Going through the motions: memory and remembrance in Cavendish.

Margaret Cavendish's conception of memory has received little scholarly attention. Here, I taxonomize various notions of memory within her system, focusing primarily on a crucial distinction between what she calls 'memory' and what she calls 'remembrance'. I will argue that Cavendish considers remem...

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Publicado en:British Journal for the History of Philosophy Vol. 33; no. 5; pp. 1120 - 1143
Autor principal: Sandoval, Tobias
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Taylor & Francis Ltd Sep2025
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Going through the motions: memory and remembrance in Cavendish.
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        au: Sandoval, Tobias
        affil: Department of Philosophy, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX, USA
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        Newcastle, Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of, ca. 1624-1674
        Memory
        Reason
        Idea (Philosophy)
        Theory of self-knowledge
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          Newcastle, Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of, ca. 1624-1674
          Memory
          Reason
          Idea (Philosophy)
          Theory of self-knowledge
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        fame
        Margaret Cavendish
        memory
        remembrance
        self-knowledge
      ab: Margaret Cavendish's conception of memory has received little scholarly attention. Here, I taxonomize various notions of memory within her system, focusing primarily on a crucial distinction between what she calls 'memory' and what she calls 'remembrance'. I will argue that Cavendish considers remembrance a more general and pervasive action in nature than memory. Memory, an action uniquely associated with animal creatures, refers to the animal's reason storing past sense perceptions and conceptions such as thoughts, ideas, imaginations, etc. Remembrances, or voluntary repetitions of past motions, manifest in two varieties. In the first, the animal retrieves perceptions or conceptions stored in memory. In the second, which all creatures exhibit, a creature's parts voluntarily repeat past actions via custom or habit, such as in respiration and photosynthesis. These remembrances do not rely on anything stored in memory but derive directly from what Cavendish calls a creature's 'self-knowledge'.
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