Wittgenstein on Cantor’s Proof.

This paper has two goals. First, we reconstruct Wittgenstein’s views on what counts as a legitimate irrational – since, as he repeatedly points out, and in agreement with mathematicians such as Emile Borel, not just every infinite string of digits qualifies as one. Once his conception (‘full-blooded...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Synthese Vol. 206; no. 3; pp. 1 - 25
Autores principales: Bangu, Sorin, Schatz, Jeffrey
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Sep2025
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
fields @attributes:
  recordID: 1
pdfLink:
plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=187655662&site=ehost-live
header:
  @attributes:
    shortDbName: hlh
    uiTerm: 187655662
    longDbName: Humanities International Complete
    uiTag: AN
  controlInfo:
    bkinfo:
    jinfo:
      jid:
        00397857
        4LI
      jtl: Synthese
      issn: 00397857
      maglogo: N
    pubinfo:
      dt: Sep2025
      vid: 206
      iid: 3
      pid: 237
      pub: Springer Nature
    artinfo:
      ui:
        187655662
        10.1007/s11229-025-05238-6
      ppf: 1
      ppct: 24
      formats:
        fmt:
          – @attributes:
              type: T
          – @attributes:
              type: P
              size: 1.1MB
      tig:
        atl: Wittgenstein on Cantor’s Proof.
      aug:
        au:
          Bangu, Sorin
          Schatz, Jeffrey
        affil:
          https://ror.org/03zga2b32 University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway
          https://ror.org/03v76x132 Yale University, New Haven, USA
      sug:
      keyword:
        Cantor
        Later Wittgenstein
        Mathematics
        Set theory
      ab: This paper has two goals. First, we reconstruct Wittgenstein’s views on what counts as a legitimate irrational – since, as he repeatedly points out, and in agreement with mathematicians such as Emile Borel, not just every infinite string of digits qualifies as one. Once his conception (‘full-blooded intensionalism’) is sketched out, and its specificity is highlighted by comparing it with two other cognate views (‘extensionalism’ and ‘quasi-intensionalism’), our second objective is to examine how his type of intensionalism impacts his attitude towards Cantor’s theorem. In this regard, the more general claim we argue for is that, despite appearances to the contrary, Wittgenstein was not a revisionist about set-theoretical practice.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
    refInfo:
    copyright:
      @attributes:
        flag: Y
      custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2025. All Rights Reserved.
      item: Synthese
      holder: Springer Nature
      dt:
        @attributes:
          year: 2025
    holdings:
      @attributes:
        islocal: N