Is Phenomenalism Superior to Russellian Panpsychism as a Theory of Consciousness and Matter?
In Phenomenalism: A Metaphysics of Chance and Experience (2023), Michael Pelczar argues that phenomenalism offers a superior account both of the nature of matter and of the relation between matter and consciousness, compared to traditional, Kantian and structural realism (when it comes to matter) an...
| Publicado en: | Philosophia Vol. 53; no. 2; pp. 487 - 498 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Apr2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=187667138&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 187667138 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00483893 1VPF jtl: Philosophia issn: 00483893 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2025 vid: 53 iid: 2 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 187667138 10.1007/s11406-025-00852-7 ppf: 487 ppct: 11 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 634KB tig: atl: Is Phenomenalism Superior to Russellian Panpsychism as a Theory of Consciousness and Matter? aug: au: Mørch, Hedda Hassel affil: https://ror.org/02dx4dc92 Department of Law, Philosophy and International Studies, University of Inland Norway, Lillehammer, Norway su: Phenomenalism Pelczar, Michael Panpsychism Consciousness Realism Materialism sug: subj: Phenomenalism Pelczar, Michael Panpsychism Consciousness Realism Materialism keyword: Categorical realizers Mind-dependence Philosophy and Religious Studies Philosophy ab: In Phenomenalism: A Metaphysics of Chance and Experience (2023), Michael Pelczar argues that phenomenalism offers a superior account both of the nature of matter and of the relation between matter and consciousness, compared to traditional, Kantian and structural realism (when it comes to matter) and traditional materialism, traditional dualism and Russellian panpsychism (when it comes to consciousness), mainly because phenomenalism is simpler than these other theories while retaining the same explanatory power. In response, I argue that phenomenalism is not really simpler than other theories, in the main respects that Pelczar considers, and in some further respects he does not consider, it is actually less simple. I will also defend Russellian panpsychism (which like phenomenalism offers a theory of both matter and consciousness) against the charge that unlike phenomenalism, it renders physical objects mind-dependent. Furthermore, phenomenalism lacks an account of mental causation. This puts it at a clear disadvantage relative to Russellian panpsychism especially, considered as a theory of consciousness. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophia is a copyright of Springer, 2025. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophia holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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