Knowing what it is.
Essentialists understand modal properties in terms of the essences of things. Given this view, it is natural to think that our knowledge of modality ultimately derives from our knowledge of the essences of things. Is that view plausible? Do we genuinely have knowledge of the essences of things, in a...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 182; no. 9; pp. 2387 - 2403 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Sep2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=187667713&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 187667713 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Sep2025 vid: 182 iid: 9 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 187667713 10.1007/s11098-023-02005-6 ppf: 2387 ppct: 16 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 636KB tig: atl: Knowing what it is. aug: au: Jago, Mark affil: https://ror.org/01ee9ar58 Department of Philosophy, University of Nottingham, University Park, NG7 2RD, Nottingham, UK su: Essentialism (Philosophy) Substance (Philosophy) Theory of knowledge Realism Philosophy sug: subj: Essentialism (Philosophy) Substance (Philosophy) Theory of knowledge Realism Philosophy keyword: Conventionalism E.J. Lowe Essence Knowledge Modal epistemology Modality ab: Essentialists understand modal properties in terms of the essences of things. Given this view, it is natural to think that our knowledge of modality ultimately derives from our knowledge of the essences of things. Is that view plausible? Do we genuinely have knowledge of the essences of things, in a form substantial enough to ground our modal knowledge? The more we pack into the notion of essence to allow it to underpin modal properties, the harder it is to claim genuine knowledge. I will argue that realists about essence of a certain kind can have the best of both worlds. They can co-opt a conventionalist explanation of our knowledge of essence, but against the background of a fully realist notion of essence. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2025. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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