Kant on Self‐Legislation as the Foundation of Duty.
Duties to oneself are central to Kant's moral thought. Indeed, in his Lectures on Ethics, he claims that they "take first place, and are the most important of all" (LE: 27:341). Despite this, Kant is not clear about what they are or why they are 'the most important.' What is it for a duty to be owed...
| Publicado en: | European Journal of Philosophy Vol. 33; no. 3; pp. 910 - 927 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Sep2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=187693043&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 187693043 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 09668373 7PU jtl: European Journal of Philosophy issn: 09668373 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Sep2025 vid: 33 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 187693043 10.1111/ejop.13026 ppf: 910 ppct: 17 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.5MB tig: atl: Kant on Self‐Legislation as the Foundation of Duty. aug: au: Eckert‐Kuang, Bennett affil: Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge MA, , USA su: Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804 Ethics Autonomy (Philosophy) Argument Interpretation (Philosophy) sug: subj: Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804 Ethics Autonomy (Philosophy) Argument Interpretation (Philosophy) ab: Duties to oneself are central to Kant's moral thought. Indeed, in his Lectures on Ethics, he claims that they "take first place, and are the most important of all" (LE: 27:341). Despite this, Kant is not clear about what they are or why they are 'the most important.' What is it for a duty to be owed to oneself? And in what sense do such duties 'take first place'? I answer these questions: a duty to oneself is a self‐legislated duty, and they 'take first place' in that all ethical duties are, fundamentally, duties to oneself. Based on a close reading of Kant's "Apparent Antinomy" regarding duties to oneself in The Doctrine of Virtue §§1–3, I argue that Kant holds that (1) a duty is owed to its legislator, and (2) all duties are self‐legislated. I then argue that this interpretation is further supported by Kant's understanding of the Categorical Imperative as a "principle of autonomy" in the Groundwork (G: 4:433). I conclude by offering an interpretation of the Categorical Imperative on which even though all duties are ultimately owed to oneself, there remains an important sense in which some duties are owed to others as well. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of European Journal of Philosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: European Journal of Philosophy holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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