Finitude and the Good Will.
According to Kant, both finite (human) and non‐finite (divine) wills are subject to the moral law, though the manner of their subjection differs. The fact that the law expresses an 'ought' for the human will is a function of our imperfection. On this picture, a non‐finite will thus enjoys a certain...
| Publicado en: | European Journal of Philosophy Vol. 33; no. 3; pp. 927 - 942 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
Sep2025
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=187693049&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 187693049 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 09668373 7PU jtl: European Journal of Philosophy issn: 09668373 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Sep2025 vid: 33 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 187693049 10.1111/ejop.13043 ppf: 927 ppct: 15 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.3MB tig: atl: Finitude and the Good Will. aug: au: Englander, Alex affil: Institute for Philosophy, University of Bonn, Bonn, Germany su: Finite, The Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804 Imperfection Autonomy (Philosophy) Explanation sug: subj: Finite, The Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804 Imperfection Autonomy (Philosophy) Explanation ab: According to Kant, both finite (human) and non‐finite (divine) wills are subject to the moral law, though the manner of their subjection differs. The fact that the law expresses an 'ought' for the human will is a function of our imperfection. On this picture, a non‐finite will thus enjoys a certain explanatory priority vis‐à‐vis its finite counterpart: we can understand the practical constraint that binds the latter by seeing how contingent limitations differentiate it from the former. However, a reading of Kant's principle of autonomy that inextricably ties the achievement of willing to the adoption of a practical standpoint, gives us reasons for doubting this order of explanation. It suggests instead that we might best understand the practical 'ought' by taking the human will as explanatorily primitive. And if we do so, we can question the coherence of taking a will for which the law is not normative to furnish a paradigmatic exemplification of the relation that lies at the heart of Kant's notion of autonomy: namely, the relation between free volition and moral necessity. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of European Journal of Philosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: European Journal of Philosophy holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|