An Aggregative Games Approach to Merger Analysis in Multiproduct‐Firm Oligopoly.
Using an aggregative games approach, we analyze horizontal mergers in a model of multiproduct‐firm price competition with CES and logit demand, allowing for arbitrary firm and product heterogeneity. We provide conditions under which a merger raises consumer surplus, and establish the dynamic optimal...
| Publicado en: | RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 56; no. 3; pp. 233 - 251 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Fall2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=187745199&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 187745199 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 07416261 56RJ jtl: RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) issn: 07416261 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Fall2025 vid: 56 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 187745199 10.1111/1756-2171.12500 ppf: 233 ppct: 18 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 363KB tig: atl: An Aggregative Games Approach to Merger Analysis in Multiproduct‐Firm Oligopoly. aug: au: Nocke, Volker Schutz, Nicolas affil: Department of Economics and MaCCI, University of Mannheim, also affiliated with CEPR, Mannheim, Germany su: Game theory Oligopolies Economic competition Mergers & acquisitions Multiproduct firms Herfindahl-Hirschman index Bargaining power Consumers' surplus sug: subj: Game theory Oligopolies Economic competition Mergers & acquisitions Multiproduct firms Herfindahl-Hirschman index Bargaining power Consumers' surplus ab: Using an aggregative games approach, we analyze horizontal mergers in a model of multiproduct‐firm price competition with CES and logit demand, allowing for arbitrary firm and product heterogeneity. We provide conditions under which a merger raises consumer surplus, and establish the dynamic optimality of a myopic, consumer‐surplus‐based merger approval policy. We also study the aggregate surplus and external effects of a merger. Finally, we show that the market power effect of a merger, defined as the welfare effect in the absence of merger‐specific synergies, can be approximated by the induced, naively computed change in the Herfindahl index. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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