Cost Coordination.

In markets with price discrimination, firms can face a trade‐off when colluding. To maintain price discrimination, upper‐level executives may have to involve lower‐level employees with the requisite demand information but that enhances the risk of the cartel's discovery. They could instead centraliz...

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Publicado en:	RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 56; no. 3; pp. 285 - 302
Autor principal:	Harrington, Joseph E.
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	Wiley-Blackwell Fall2025
Materias:	Heterogeneity Price discrimination Product differentiation Cartels Price regulation Collusion Cost control
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost