Maps, Simulations, Spaces and Dynamics: On Distinguishing Types of Structural Representations.
Structural representations are likely the most talked about representational posits in the contemporary debate over cognitive representations. Indeed, the debate surrounding them is so vast virtually every claim about them has been made. Some, for instance, claimed structural representations are dif...
| Publicado en: | Erkenntnis Vol. 90; no. 7; pp. 2743 - 2765 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Oct2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=187864048&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 187864048 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01650106 5KZ jtl: Erkenntnis issn: 01650106 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2025 vid: 90 iid: 7 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 187864048 10.1007/s10670-024-00831-6 ppf: 2743 ppct: 22 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 994KB tig: atl: Maps, Simulations, Spaces and Dynamics: On Distinguishing Types of Structural Representations. aug: au: Facchin, Marco affil: https://ror.org/008x57b05 Centre for Philosophical Psychology, Antwerp University, Prinstraat 13, 2000, Antwerp, Belgium su: Representation (Philosophy) Structural models Prediction models Mental representation Logical fallacies Differentiation (Cognition) sug: subj: Representation (Philosophy) Structural models Prediction models Mental representation Logical fallacies Differentiation (Cognition) keyword: Indicator representations Psychology and Cognitive Sciences Psychology Simulations Structural representations Structural similarity ab: Structural representations are likely the most talked about representational posits in the contemporary debate over cognitive representations. Indeed, the debate surrounding them is so vast virtually every claim about them has been made. Some, for instance, claimed structural representations are different from indicators. Others argued they are the same. Some claimed structural representations mesh perfectly with mechanistic explanations, others argued they can't in principle mash. Some claimed structural representations are central to predictive processing accounts of cognition, others rebuked predictive processing networks are blissfully structural representation free. And so forth. Here, I suggest this confusing state of affairs is due to the fact that the term "structural representations" is applied to a number of distinct conceptions of representations. In this paper, I distinguish four such conceptions, argue that these four conceptions are actually distinct, and then show that such a fourfold distinction can be used to clarify some of the most pressing questions concerning structural representations and their role in cognitive theorizing, making these questions more easily answerable. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Erkenntnis is a copyright of Springer, 2025. All Rights Reserved. item: Erkenntnis holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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