Psychology and Neuroscience. The (New) Autonomy Question.
The traditional thesis of the autonomy of psychology from neuroscience is grounded in a metaphysical thesis; the irreducibility thesis. Anti-reductionism is still dominant nowadays, and, as a consequence, autonomists arguably stand on firmer grounds. Still, an anti-autonomist might have the intuitio...
| Publicado en: | Erkenntnis Vol. 90; no. 7; pp. 2909 - 2929 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Oct2025
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=187864050&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 187864050 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01650106 5KZ jtl: Erkenntnis issn: 01650106 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2025 vid: 90 iid: 7 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 187864050 10.1007/s10670-024-00833-4 ppf: 2909 ppct: 20 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 821KB tig: atl: Psychology and Neuroscience. The (New) Autonomy Question. aug: au: Bantegnie, Brice affil: https://ror.org/01hyg6578 Department of Analytic Philosophy, Institute of Philosophy Academy of Science of the Czech Republic, Jilská 1, 110 00 Praha 1- Staré Město, Prague, Czech Republic su: Psychology Neurosciences Reductionism Theory of knowledge Autonomy (Philosophy) sug: subj: Psychology Neurosciences Reductionism Theory of knowledge Autonomy (Philosophy) keyword: Psychology and Cognitive Sciences Psychology ab: The traditional thesis of the autonomy of psychology from neuroscience is grounded in a metaphysical thesis; the irreducibility thesis. Anti-reductionism is still dominant nowadays, and, as a consequence, autonomists arguably stand on firmer grounds. Still, an anti-autonomist might have the intuition that even if psychology is not reducible to neuroscience, there is a sense, not metaphysically grounded, but epistemologically grounded, in which psychology clearly is not autonomous from neuroscience. The challenge is then to offer a concept of autonomy which allows for the articulation of a new and significant autonomy thesis, and to show that the thesis is false. The thesis that psychologists need not consider neuroscientific explanations when putting forward psychological explanations is such a thesis. I take it that both this characterization of autonomy and an antiautonomist argument in this sense can already be found in a paper co-authored by Gualtiero Piccinini and CarlCraver. Piccinini and Craver's attack on this thesis is grounded on the claim that psychologists should support their functional analyses by means ofmechanistic explanations for the former to be justified at all. I also take it that, as Lawrence Shapiro has shown, their argument ultimately fails. But this was a very valuable attempt, and, in this paper, I intend to build on it with the aim of offering a new and hopefully effective anti-autonomist argument. I contend that psychologists do need to consider neuroscientific explanations when putting forward psychological explanations, and this stems from the fact that they provide the same type of explanations of the same kind of phenomena as neuroscientist, or so I argue. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Erkenntnis is a copyright of Springer, 2025. All Rights Reserved. item: Erkenntnis holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|