Imagination Cannot Generate Empirical Justification or Knowledge.
What is the epistemic function of imagination? Traditionally, philosophers have claimed that the epistemic function of imagination is exhausted by its ability to provide justification for modal beliefs, or that it is epistemically irrelevant. However, in recent years a number of philosophers have br...
| Publicado en: | Erkenntnis Vol. 90; no. 7; pp. 2951 - 2971 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Oct2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=187864060&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 187864060 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01650106 5KZ jtl: Erkenntnis issn: 01650106 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2025 vid: 90 iid: 7 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 187864060 10.1007/s10670-024-00847-y ppf: 2951 ppct: 20 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 808KB tig: atl: Imagination Cannot Generate Empirical Justification or Knowledge. aug: au: Egeland, Jonathan affil: https://ror.org/03x297z98 University of Agder, Kristiansand, Norway https://ror.org/05xg72x27 Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway su: Imagination Justification (Theory of knowledge) Empirical research Awareness Dilemma Theory of knowledge Modern philosophy sug: subj: Imagination Justification (Theory of knowledge) Empirical research Awareness Dilemma Theory of knowledge Modern philosophy ab: What is the epistemic function of imagination? Traditionally, philosophers have claimed that the epistemic function of imagination is exhausted by its ability to provide justification for modal beliefs, or that it is epistemically irrelevant. However, in recent years a number of philosophers have broken with the tradition by arguing that imagination can generate justification or knowledge about contingent empirical facts. This paper argues against this view by developing a new dilemma. The upshot of the argument is that although imagination does have an important epistemic function that has evaded the traditional view, it cannot give rise to new empirical justification or knowledge. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Erkenntnis is a copyright of Springer, 2025. All Rights Reserved. item: Erkenntnis holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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