Does Reliabilism Make Knowledge Merely Conditional?

Features on the view on reliabilism on knowledge. Presentation of Laurence BonJour on the problem for reliabilism; Consideration of Barry Stroud of the status of the externalist's belief in externalism; formulation of the problem to the externalist's belief in his own theory.

Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Philosophical Issues Vol. 14; no. 1; pp. 185 - 201
Autor principal: Kornblith, Hilary
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Oct2004
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        au: Kornblith, Hilary
        affil: University of Massachusetts, Amherst
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        Reliability (Personality trait)
        Externalism (Philosophy of mind)
        Theory
        BonJour, Laurence
        Stroud, Barry, 1935-2019
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          Reliability (Personality trait)
          Externalism (Philosophy of mind)
          Theory
          BonJour, Laurence
          Stroud, Barry, 1935-2019
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