On the Axiomatisation of Elgesem's Logic of Agency and Ability.

In this paper we show that the Hilbert system of agency and ability presented by Dag Elgesem is incomplete with respect to the intended semantics. We argue that completeness result may be easily regained. Finally, we shortly discuss some issues related to the philosophical intuition behind his appro...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Journal of Philosophical Logic Vol. 34; no. 4; pp. 403 - 432
Autores principales: Governatori, Guido, Rotolo, Antonino
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Aug2005
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
fields @attributes:
  recordID: 1
pdfLink:
plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=18791198&site=ehost-live
header:
  @attributes:
    shortDbName: hlh
    uiTerm: 18791198
    longDbName: Humanities International Complete
    uiTag: AN
  controlInfo:
    bkinfo:
    jinfo:
      jid:
        00223611
        JPH
      jtl: Journal of Philosophical Logic
      issn: 00223611
      maglogo: N
    pubinfo:
      dt: Aug2005
      vid: 34
      iid: 4
      pid: 237
      pub: Springer Nature
    artinfo:
      ui:
        18791198
        10.1007/s10992-004-6368-1
      ppf: 403
      ppct: 29
      formats:
        fmt:
          @attributes:
            type: P
            size: 311KB
      tig:
        atl: On the Axiomatisation of Elgesem's Logic of Agency and Ability.
      aug:
        au:
          Governatori, Guido
          Rotolo, Antonino
        affil:
          School of Information Technology and Electrical Engineering , The University of Queensland , Brisbane QLD 4072 Australia
          CIRSFID, Law Faculty , University of Bologna , Via Galliera 3 40121 Bologna Italy
      su:
        Logic
        Philosophy
        Axioms
        Semantics
        Intuition
      sug:
        subj:
          Logic
          Philosophy
          Axioms
          Semantics
          Intuition
      ab: In this paper we show that the Hilbert system of agency and ability presented by Dag Elgesem is incomplete with respect to the intended semantics. We argue that completeness result may be easily regained. Finally, we shortly discuss some issues related to the philosophical intuition behind his approach. This is done by examining Elgesem's modal logic of agency and ability using semantics with different flavours.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
    refInfo:
    copyright:
      @attributes:
        flag: Y
      custom: Journal of Philosophical Logic is a copyright of Springer, 2005. All Rights Reserved.
      item: Journal of Philosophical Logic
      holder: Springer Nature
      dt:
        @attributes:
          year: 2005
    holdings:
      @attributes:
        islocal: N