Inherent constraints on imagistic imagination.

A common and influential view sees imagistic imagining as an inherently free and unbounded type of thought that can nevertheless be subjected to epistemic constraints in individual instances. On this view, epistemic constraints can be imposed on imagistic imaginings to varying degrees, or not at all...

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Publicado en:Philosophy & Phenomenological Research Vol. 111; no. 2; pp. 571 - 590
Autor principal: Langland‐Hassan, Peter
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Sep2025
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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      dt: Sep2025
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        atl: Inherent constraints on imagistic imagination.
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        au: Langland‐Hassan, Peter
        affil: Department of Philosophy, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati Ohio, , USA
      su:
        Imagination
        Epistemics
        Possibility
        Metaphysics
        Mental imagery
      sug:
        subj:
          Imagination
          Epistemics
          Possibility
          Metaphysics
          Mental imagery
      keyword:
        AI
        constraints
        epistemology
        imagination
        mental imagery
        sensory imagination
      ab: A common and influential view sees imagistic imagining as an inherently free and unbounded type of thought that can nevertheless be subjected to epistemic constraints in individual instances. On this view, epistemic constraints can be imposed on imagistic imaginings to varying degrees, or not at all. The application of such constraints is said to allow imagination to serve as a route to knowledge, not just about the bounds of metaphysical possibility, but about quotidian contingent truths as well. This paper challenges that understanding of imagination by defending a new style of view where all imagistic imaginings occur under the same constraints and where these constraints are inherent within imagination itself. The argument relies in part on an analogy between imagistic imagination and image‐generating AI algorithms such as Midjourney and DALL‐E 3. On the inherent constraints view defended here, imaginings have the same positive epistemic value in all of their instances, with no need for willfully imposed constraints.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
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      src: R
    language: English
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          year: 2025
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