Can we perceive modal properties?
Can we see only how things actually are, or are we also able to see how things could be? Much work in philosophy of perception assumes that our visual perceptual experience is restricted to the actual world: we cannot directly interact with nor consequently perceive other possible worlds. Contrary t...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy & Phenomenological Research Vol. 111; no. 2; pp. 607 - 631 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Sep2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=187979498&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 187979498 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318205 PPO jtl: Philosophy & Phenomenological Research issn: 00318205 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Sep2025 vid: 111 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 187979498 10.1111/phpr.70044 ppf: 607 ppct: 24 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 806KB tig: atl: Can we perceive modal properties? aug: au: Munton, Jessie affil: Faculty of Philosophy, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK St John's College, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK su: Perception (Philosophy) Possibility Phenomenology Modern philosophy Epistemics sug: subj: Perception (Philosophy) Possibility Phenomenology Modern philosophy Epistemics ab: Can we see only how things actually are, or are we also able to see how things could be? Much work in philosophy of perception assumes that our visual perceptual experience is restricted to the actual world: we cannot directly interact with nor consequently perceive other possible worlds. Contrary to this line of thought, this paper defends the claim that we can visually perceive modal properties. Those modal properties are represented in visual experience, contributing to both its content and phenomenology. I argue that this claim is supported by the phenomenology of our visual experience, the epistemic role it plays, and by empirical work in vision science. However, it is the theoretical gains for our understanding of visual objecthood that make the strongest case for allowing that modal properties feature in our visual experience. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy & Phenomenological Research is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy & Phenomenological Research holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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