Experience and Political Action in Kant: Between Cynicism and Moral Significance.

By holding that the anthropological condition of unsociable sociability forms the sinew of Kant's conception of political action, this essay distinguishes the relationship between experience and political agency from that between experience and moral agency. It argues that the former cannot be fully...

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Published in:Problems / Problemos Vol. 107; pp. 40 - 53
Main Author: Thomas, Nithin Jacob
Format: Article
Published: Vilnius University 2025
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Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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      dt: 2025
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        10.15388/Problemos.2025.107.3
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        atl: Experience and Political Action in Kant: Between Cynicism and Moral Significance.
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        au: Thomas, Nithin Jacob
        affil: University of Hyderabad, India
      su:
        Moral agent (Philosophy)
        Cynicism
        Expertise
        Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804
        Philosophers
        Aesthetic experience
        Political participation
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          Moral agent (Philosophy)
          Cynicism
          Expertise
          Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804
          Philosophers
          Aesthetic experience
          Political participation
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        aesthetic experience
        Kantian anthropology
        Kantian ethics
        political action
        unsociable sociability
        estetinis patyrimas
        Kanto antropologija
        Kanto etika
        nesociabilus sociabilumas
      ab:
        By holding that the anthropological condition of unsociable sociability forms the sinew of Kant's conception of political action, this essay distinguishes the relationship between experience and political agency from that between experience and moral agency. It argues that the former cannot be fully subsumed under the latter since political action, for Kant, is bound up with the mobilisation and manoeuvring of our cynical experiences. Kant maintains that the cunning of nature assists politics by channelling selfish interests into outcomes that ultimately advance a lawful civil order. The essay then turns to experiences that are, by contrast, symbols of the moral faculty by virtue of involving a 'disinterested interest', as most clearly articulated by Kant in his account of aesthetic experience. Given that political action primarily operates on prudential grounds, it may seem unlikely that it would also serve as a symbol of humanity's moral predisposition. Yet, foregrounding disinterested interest as a general trait of morally significant experience opens an intriguing space to read Kant's consideration of revolution as a historical sign of our moral vocation.
        Laikantis nuostatos, kad nesociabilaus sociabilumo antropologinė sąlyga formuoja Kanto politinio veiksmo sąvokos raumenis, šis straipsnis atskiria santykį tarp patyrimo ir politinio veiksmo nuo santykio tarp patyrimo ir moralinio veiksmo. Straipsnyje teigiama, kad pirmasis santykis negali būti visiškai subordinuotas antrajam santykiui, kadangi Kantui politinis veiksmas yra susijęs su mūsų ciniškųjų patirčių mobilizavimu ir manevravimu. Kantas teigia, kad gamtos klastingumas padeda politikai, kadangi savanaudiškus interesus nukreipia į tokias baigtis, kurios galiausiai įgalina teisėtą pilietinės tvarkos pažangą. Tuomet straipsnis imasi nagrinėti patyrimus, kurie, atvirkščiai, išreiškia moralinę gebą dėl „nesuinteresuoto intereso", kurį Kantas aiškiausiai išreiškė kalbėdamas apie estetinę patirtį. Kadangi politinis veiksmas visų pirma įgyvendinamas remiantis išmintingumu, gali atrodyti neįtikėtina, kad jis taip pat veiktų ir kaip moralinės predispozicijos simbolis. Tačiau jei nesuinteresuotą interesą iškeliame į pirmą planą kaip bendrąjį moraliai reikšmingo patyrimo bruožą, atsiveria intriguojanti galimybė Kanto svarstymus apie revoliuciją interpretuoti kaip istorinį mūsų moralinio pašaukimo ženklą.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
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    language: English
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