| Sumario: | The article focuses on John Dewey's approach to the mind-body problem, arguing that his ultimate solution is rooted in his metametaphysical qualitative naturalism rather than his emergentist metaphysics. The author contends that Dewey's emergent theory of mind is a consequence of this qualitative naturalism, which seeks to revise the foundational assumptions that generate the mind-body problem. The paper is divided into two parts: the first examines the debate between scholars Thomas Alexander and Richard Rorty regarding Dewey's metaphysical interpretations, while the second presents a metametaphysical reading of Dewey's philosophy, emphasizing the need to restore immediate qualities to their rightful place in understanding natural events. The author concludes that Dewey's qualitative naturalism provides a framework for addressing the mind-body problem without falling into classical metaphysical traps.
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