Vagueness, normativity, and inescapable questions.
Our concept bald displays all of the features paradigmatic of vagueness. For instance, it is sorites-susceptible. Moreover, the concept allows for cases of a distinctive kind in the middling part of the sorites series – cases for which it seems "there is just no fact of the matter" whether the membe...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 182; no. 10; pp. 2785 - 2813 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Oct2025
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=188798726&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 188798726 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2025 vid: 182 iid: 10 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 188798726 10.1007/s11098-025-02350-8 ppf: 2785 ppct: 28 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 848KB tig: atl: Vagueness, normativity, and inescapable questions. aug: au: Sud, Rohan affil: https://ror.org/02smfhw86 Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, USA su: Vagueness (Philosophy) Normativity (Ethics) Phenomenology Modern philosophy Attitude (Psychology) sug: subj: Vagueness (Philosophy) Normativity (Ethics) Phenomenology Modern philosophy Attitude (Psychology) keyword: Philosophy and Religious Studies Philosophy ab: Our concept bald displays all of the features paradigmatic of vagueness. For instance, it is sorites-susceptible. Moreover, the concept allows for cases of a distinctive kind in the middling part of the sorites series – cases for which it seems "there is just no fact of the matter" whether the member is bald. Our concept ought displays some of these same features. For instance, it too is sorites-susceptible. However, there is a difference. The middling cases in an ought sorites series lack the "no fact of the matter" phenomenology. In this paper, I ask: why do we have the no fact of the matter phenomenology for descriptive concepts? And what's special about our concept of ought that it lacks that phenomenology? I start by giving a rigorous characterization of the "no fact of the matter" phenomenology in terms of questioning attitudes. When it comes to middling cases of our concept bald, it is confused to continue to ask whether the person is bald. This isn't so for middling cases of our concept ought: we can reasonably wonder what one ought to do in the middling cases. I then offer an explanation for this zetetic difference. I argue that, asking questions about middling cases in a sorites is typically costly. But for certain normative concepts, the questions are inescapable, and so it's a cost we must pay. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2025. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|