The Illusion of Meritocracy: Evidence from Provincial Official Promotion in Post-Mao China.
We study the promotion of provincial level officials between 1978 and 2022 and cannot find empirical support for the meritocratic argument. Work ties with top leaders, particularly with the leadership core, have provided provincial officials with advantage in promotion. Methodologically, we use offi...
| Published in: | Journal of Contemporary China Vol. 34; no. 156; pp. 949 - 971 |
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| Main Authors: | , , |
| Format: | Article |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
Nov2025
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=188804975&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 188804975 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 10670564 LCC jtl: Journal of Contemporary China issn: 10670564 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Nov2025 vid: 34 iid: 156 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 188804975 10.1080/10670564.2025.2450016 ppf: 949 ppct: 22 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T db: hlh ui: 188804975 – @attributes: type: P db: hlh ui: 188804975 tig: atl: The Illusion of Meritocracy: Evidence from Provincial Official Promotion in Post-Mao China. aug: au: Zhou, Minhui Su, Fubing Tao, Ran affil: Xiangtan University, China Vassar College, USA The Chinese University of Hong Kong, China su: China Meritocracy Economic policy Economic development Patronage Political systems Empirical research Fixed effects model sug: subj: Meritocracy Economic policy Economic development Patronage Political systems Empirical research China Fixed effects model keyword: elite politics official promotion patronage elite politics official promotion patronage ab: We study the promotion of provincial level officials between 1978 and 2022 and cannot find empirical support for the meritocratic argument. Work ties with top leaders, particularly with the leadership core, have provided provincial officials with advantage in promotion. Methodologically, we use official individual fixed effects to estimate a cleaner effect of social ties and show that previous research has underestimated this impact. This study contributes to the debate about elite politics in contemporary China and offers a firmer empirical grounding for understanding the political foundation of China's economic policies and overall development. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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