Obligations and Permissions, and Conflicting Norms.
This article engages with the problem faced by deontic logic in dealing with conflicting norms, taking the issue back to the representation of the logical relations between deontic operators in a square of opposition. Reaction to empirical evidence of conflicting obligations has produced a rejection...
| Publicado en: | Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy Vol. 91; no. 5; pp. 1 - 12 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
Oct2025
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=188962687&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 188962687 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00405825 HL0 jtl: Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy issn: 00405825 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Oct2025 vid: 91 iid: 5 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 188962687 10.1111/theo.70032 ppf: 1 ppct: 11 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 350KB tig: atl: Obligations and Permissions, and Conflicting Norms. aug: au: Halpin, Andrew affil: Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore, , Singapore su: Deontic logic Subaltern Kramer, Matthew Steiner, Hillel Political philosophy sug: subj: Deontic logic Subaltern Kramer, Matthew Steiner, Hillel Political philosophy keyword: conflicting norms deontic logic deontic X structure square of opposition ab: This article engages with the problem faced by deontic logic in dealing with conflicting norms, taking the issue back to the representation of the logical relations between deontic operators in a square of opposition. Reaction to empirical evidence of conflicting obligations has produced a rejection of the relations depicted in the sides of a square of opposition, while leaving the diagonal contradictories forming a deontic X structure. It is argued, first, that the contradictory relations between obligation and permission are a prerequisite for any deontic logic. Secondly, that the deontic X structure is not plausible without the supporting relations in the sides of the deontic square. Thirdly, that the conundrum of the apparent incompatibility between the contrary and subaltern relations found in the square, and the empirical evidence of conflicting obligations in actual systems of norms, can be resolved by taking deontic logic as applying primarily to individual norms and only as a secondary matter being involved with identifying conflicts between norms. This produces both a more effective approach to deontic logic, capable of dealing with conflicting norms, and also a more modest approach, in acknowledging its inability to prevent or resolve conflict between norms. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|