Bureaucrats–Enterprise Negotiation in China's Enterprise Reform at the Local Level: case studies in Guangzhou.
This article explores the implementation of SOE reform in China at the local level, using case studies in Guangzhou as illustration. It is argued that local government spearheads a reform agenda that puts locally-defined state objectives first, not necessarily favouring enterprise restructuring. A f...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Contemporary China Vol. 14; no. 45; pp. 695 - 721 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
Nov2005
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=18908759&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 18908759 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 10670564 LCC jtl: Journal of Contemporary China issn: 10670564 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Nov2005 vid: 14 iid: 45 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 18908759 10.1080/10670560500206058 ppf: 695 ppct: 26 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T db: hlh ui: 18908759 – @attributes: type: P db: hlh ui: 18908759 tig: atl: Bureaucrats–Enterprise Negotiation in China's Enterprise Reform at the Local Level: case studies in Guangzhou. aug: au: Cheung, Anthony B. L. su: China Zhu, Rongji, 1928- Employee ownership Business enterprises Capitalism Employee stock options Chinese economic policy sug: subj: Employee ownership Business enterprises Capitalism China Employee stock options Chinese economic policy Zhu, Rongji, 1928- ab: This article explores the implementation of SOE reform in China at the local level, using case studies in Guangzhou as illustration. It is argued that local government spearheads a reform agenda that puts locally-defined state objectives first, not necessarily favouring enterprise restructuring. A full-fledged negotiation model does not exist in SOE reforms because all enterprises are controlled by the state and have to comply with top-down policies and orders. Government-enterprise relations and the degree of entrepreneurial power depend largely on the economic strength of the enterprise, with the boomers getting a good economic bargain while the laggards fail to gain sympathy from government. Enterprise workers are largely at the mercy of restructuring decisions that come from bargaining and at times collusion between managers and local bureaucrats. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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