Logical intuitions or matching heuristics? Examining the effect of deduction training on belief-based reasoning judgments.

When individuals are asked to evaluate the believability of the conclusions to valid or invalid arguments, they often endorse valid conclusions at higher rates than invalid ones. This effect of validity on belief judgments—the "logic-belief effect" —is considered evidence of intuitive logic. However...

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Publicado en:Memory & Cognition Vol. 53; no. 7; pp. 2279 - 2301
Autores principales: Ghasemi, Omid, Handley, Simon J., Stephens, Rachel G.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Oct2025
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Logical intuitions or matching heuristics? Examining the effect of deduction training on belief-based reasoning judgments.
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          Ghasemi, Omid
          Handley, Simon J.
          Stephens, Rachel G.
        affil:
          https://ror.org/03r8z3t63 School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, 2052, Sydney, NSW, Australia
          https://ror.org/01sf06y89 School of Psychological Sciences, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia
          https://ror.org/00892tw58 School of Psychology, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, Australia
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        Australia
        Undergraduates
        Learning
        Ethical decision making
        Logic
        Judgment (Psychology)
        Research funding
        Probability theory
        Statistical sampling
        Online information services
        Regression analysis
      sug:
        subj:
          Undergraduates
          Learning
          Ethical decision making
          Logic
          Judgment (Psychology)
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      keyword:
        Deductive reasoning
        Dual process
        Intuitive logic
        Logic training
        Matching heuristic
        Nonexclusivity
        Psychology and Cognitive Sciences Psychology Philosophy and Religious Studies Philosophy
        Deductive reasoning
        Dual process
        Intuitive logic
        Logic training
        Matching heuristic
        Nonexclusivity
        Psychology and Cognitive Sciences Psychology Philosophy and Religious Studies Philosophy
      ab: When individuals are asked to evaluate the believability of the conclusions to valid or invalid arguments, they often endorse valid conclusions at higher rates than invalid ones. This effect of validity on belief judgments—the "logic-belief effect" —is considered evidence of intuitive logic. However, recent studies challenged this interpretation by demonstrating that "pseudo-logical" arguments interfere with belief judgments in the same way as valid logical structures do. This finding suggests that a simple heuristic that relies on the matching of constituent propositions, rather than sensitivity to logical validity per se, may lead to the logic-belief effect. To further test this matching heuristic account, across two experiments, we instructed participants to evaluate the conclusions of a series of logical and pseudo-logical arguments based on logic or belief, before and after a logic training block. The results showed that whilst both judgment types were impacted by both logical and pseudo-logical structures before training, after training the effect of the latter was indeed minimized in logic judgments but not belief judgments. The results largely support the matching heuristic account, which have important implications for contemporary dual-process theories of reasoning.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
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