De-Idealising Epistemology Through Collectivising.
According to a recent argument, we should de-idealise analytic epistemology: when theorising our epistemic practices and obligations, we should stop abstracting away epistemically relevant features of knowers, such as their social identities. This paper puts in dialogue two apparently unrelated argu...
| Publicado en: | International Journal of Philosophical Studies Vol. 33; no. 2; pp. 183 - 206 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
May2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=189188933&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 189188933 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 09672559 5BE jtl: International Journal of Philosophical Studies issn: 09672559 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: May2025 vid: 33 iid: 2 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 189188933 10.1080/09672559.2025.2482906 ppf: 183 ppct: 23 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 374KB tig: atl: De-Idealising Epistemology Through Collectivising. aug: au: Mitova, Veli affil: African Centre for Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa su: Theory of knowledge Group identity Responsibility Philosophy sug: subj: Theory of knowledge Group identity Responsibility Philosophy keyword: active ignorance epistemic injustice epistemic marginalisation epistemic oppression group epistemology Non-ideal epistemology ab: According to a recent argument, we should de-idealise analytic epistemology: when theorising our epistemic practices and obligations, we should stop abstracting away epistemically relevant features of knowers, such as their social identities. This paper puts in dialogue two apparently unrelated arguments for non-ideal epistemology – McKenna (2023) and Basu (2023) – focusing on the obligation to engage with challenges to our beliefs. I argue that while these are welcome first steps towards de-idealisation, we need to de-idealise further by acknowledging the role that groups (of a very peculiar kind) play in arguments for de-idealising. Many of the things we want to say about knowers in a non-ideal epistemology, I show, turn on these knowers' group membership and the epistemic authority ascribed to their group. Acknowledging this incurs the burden of theorising such groups. Accepting this burden, I aim to show, is both necessary and worthwhile for a fully non-ideal epistemology. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of International Journal of Philosophical Studies is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: International Journal of Philosophical Studies holder: Taylor & Francis Ltd dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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