A trope‐theoretic solution to the missing value problem.
One metaphysical problem about laws is how to find appropriate truthmakers for fully general functional laws. What makes it true, for instance, that an uninstantiated mass would interact with others as prescribed by laws concerning mass? This is the missing value problem. D. M. Armstrong attempted t...
| Publicado en: | Nous (0029-4624) Vol. 59; no. 4; pp. 988 - 1005 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Dec2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=189393079&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 189393079 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00294624 D97 jtl: Nous (0029-4624) issn: 00294624 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Dec2025 vid: 59 iid: 4 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 189393079 10.1111/nous.12543 ppf: 988 ppct: 17 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 203KB tig: atl: A trope‐theoretic solution to the missing value problem. aug: au: Audi, Paul affil: University of Rochester, Rochester New York, , USA su: Metaphysics Causality (Physics) Logic sug: subj: Metaphysics Causality (Physics) Logic ab: One metaphysical problem about laws is how to find appropriate truthmakers for fully general functional laws. What makes it true, for instance, that an uninstantiated mass would interact with others as prescribed by laws concerning mass? This is the missing value problem. D. M. Armstrong attempted to solve it by appeal to determinable universals. I will offer a trope‐theoretic solution that, while in some ways more metaphysically adventurous than Armstrong's view, avoids commitment to universals and determinables (as different from their determinates). The solution makes use of a special conception of tropes as capable of intrinsic change. It also makes use of a distinction between two ways of having a causal power (a distinction we should make in any case). Existing powers‐based approaches to the problem struggle to avoid the idea that powers mysteriously point beyond themselves. But if tropes are capable of intrinsic change in the way I propose, they can account for the full generality of laws with minimal pointing beyond, and can do so while retaining natures that are credibly intrinsic. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Nous (0029-4624) is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Nous (0029-4624) holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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