The Cogito and sums.
Eliminativist microphysical nihilism (EMN) is the view that there are many submicroscopic simples but no other material objects, and neither you nor I nor any ordinary objects exist. I defend a Cogito-based argument against EMN: (1) I am conscious; (2) if so, then I exist; therefore (3) I exist. I a...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 182; no. 11/12; pp. 3149 - 3180 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Dec2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=189532725&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 189532725 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2025 vid: 182 iid: 11/12 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 189532725 10.1007/s11098-025-02391-z ppf: 3149 ppct: 31 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.2MB tig: atl: The Cogito and sums. aug: au: Gilmore, Cody affil: https://ror.org/05rrcem69 Department of Philosophy, University of California, Davis, 95616, Davis, CA, USA su: Whole & parts (Philosophy) Nihilism (Philosophy) Cartesianism (Philosophy) Consciousness Religious studies sug: subj: Whole & parts (Philosophy) Nihilism (Philosophy) Cartesianism (Philosophy) Consciousness Religious studies keyword: Cogito Descartes Mereology Personal ontology Philosophy and Religious Studies Philosophy Subjects of experience ab: Eliminativist microphysical nihilism (EMN) is the view that there are many submicroscopic simples but no other material objects, and neither you nor I nor any ordinary objects exist. I defend a Cogito-based argument against EMN: (1) I am conscious; (2) if so, then I exist; therefore (3) I exist. I address those who deny (1) but concede that some surrogate is certain. The surrogates I consider include: 〈if all the simples were just as they actually are but these simples composed something, I would be conscious〉, 〈some things are collectively conscious〉, 〈there is an experience〉, 〈this is an experience›, and 〈these are collectively conscious〉. I offer an abductive argument for the view, Cartesianism, that (1) itself is certain. I specify four logically complex propositions about consciousness that everyone should take to be certain, and I argue that Cartesianism better explains the certainty of these four propositions than do its EMN-friendly alternatives. I call the argument the Abductive Meta-Cogito. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2025. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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