RELIABILIST JUSTIFICATION (OR KNOWLEDGE) AS A GOOD TRUTH-RATIO.

Fair lotteries offer familiar ways to pose a number of epistemological problems, prominently those of closure and of scepticism. Although these problems apply to many epistemological positions, in this paper I develop a variant of a lottery case to raise a difficulty with the reliabilist's fundament...

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Publicado en:Pacific Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 86; no. 4; pp. 445 - 459
Autor principal: ADLER, JONATHAN E.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Dec2005
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: RELIABILIST JUSTIFICATION (OR KNOWLEDGE) AS A GOOD TRUTH-RATIO.
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        au: ADLER, JONATHAN E.
        affil: Department of Philosophy Brooklyn College and the Graduate School, CUNY
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        Empiricism
        Theory of knowledge
        Justification (Theory of knowledge)
        Skepticism
        Agnosticism
        Justification (Ethics)
        Philosophical anthropology
        Philosophy
        Metaphysics
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          Empiricism
          Theory of knowledge
          Justification (Theory of knowledge)
          Skepticism
          Agnosticism
          Justification (Ethics)
          Philosophical anthropology
          Philosophy
          Metaphysics
      ab: Fair lotteries offer familiar ways to pose a number of epistemological problems, prominently those of closure and of scepticism. Although these problems apply to many epistemological positions, in this paper I develop a variant of a lottery case to raise a difficulty with the reliabilist's fundamental claim that justification or knowledge is to be analyzed as a high truth-ratio (of the relevant belief-forming processes). In developing the difficulty broader issues are joined including fallibility and the relation of reliability to understanding.
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