What is pre‐reflective self‐consciousness an awareness of? An argument for the egological view.
The nature of pre‐reflective self‐consciousness—namely, the putative non‐inferential self‐consciousness involved in unreflective experiences—has become the topic of considerable debate in recent analytic philosophy of consciousness, as it is commonly taken to be what makes conscious mental states fi...
| Publicado en: | Southern Journal of Philosophy Vol. 63; no. 4; pp. 533 - 553 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Dec2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=189877649&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 189877649 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00384283 2GW jtl: Southern Journal of Philosophy issn: 00384283 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Dec2025 vid: 63 iid: 4 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 189877649 10.1111/sjp.12614 ppf: 533 ppct: 20 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 574KB tig: atl: What is pre‐reflective self‐consciousness an awareness of? An argument for the egological view. aug: au: Barbieri, Alberto affil: Faculty of Philosophy, Vita‐Salute San Raffaele University, Milano, Italy su: Self-consciousness (Awareness) Consciousness Perspective (Philosophy) Analytic philosophy sug: subj: Self-consciousness (Awareness) Consciousness Perspective (Philosophy) Analytic philosophy ab: The nature of pre‐reflective self‐consciousness—namely, the putative non‐inferential self‐consciousness involved in unreflective experiences—has become the topic of considerable debate in recent analytic philosophy of consciousness, as it is commonly taken to be what makes conscious mental states first‐personally given to their subject. A major issue of controversy in this debate concerns what pre‐reflective self‐consciousness is an awareness of. Some scholars have suggested that pre‐reflective self‐consciousness involves an awareness of the experiencing subject. This "egological view" is opposed to the "non‐egological view," according to which the subject is just aware of their own occurrent mental state in being pre‐reflectively self‐conscious. In this article, I argue in favor of the egological view. The argument I develop is a qualified version of a line of reasoning originally provided by Rosenthal and builds on a proper clarification of the ontological status of token mental states. More precisely, I argue that token mental states are structured "fact‐like" entities having their subject among their constituents. Accordingly, one cannot be aware of one's own occurrent mental state without thereby being aware of oneself. I conclude by dismissing a potential objection to my argument. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Southern Journal of Philosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Southern Journal of Philosophy holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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