Spacetime functionalism and the collapse problem.

Recent work in quantum gravity (QG) suggests that spacetime is not fundamental. Rather, spacetime emerges from an underlying non-spatiotemporal reality. Spacetime functionalism has been proposed as one way to make sense of the emergence of spacetime. However, spacetime functionalism faces a 'collaps...

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Published in:Synthese Vol. 207; no. 1; pp. 1 - 26
Main Author: Baron, Sam
Format: Article
Published: Springer Nature Jan2026
Subjects:
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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        10.1007/s11229-025-05335-6
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        atl: Spacetime functionalism and the collapse problem.
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        au: Baron, Sam
        affil: https://ror.org/01ej9dk98 School of Historical and Philosophical Studies, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia
      su:
        Spacetime
        Quantum gravity
        Ontology
        Metaphysics
        Functionals
        Emergence (Philosophy)
        Theorists
      sug:
        subj:
          Spacetime
          Quantum gravity
          Ontology
          Metaphysics
          Functionals
          Emergence (Philosophy)
          Theorists
      keyword:
        Emergence
        Functionalism
        Fundamentality
      ab: Recent work in quantum gravity (QG) suggests that spacetime is not fundamental. Rather, spacetime emerges from an underlying non-spatiotemporal reality. Spacetime functionalism has been proposed as one way to make sense of the emergence of spacetime. However, spacetime functionalism faces a 'collapse' problem. The functionalist analysis seems to force spacetime into the (more) fundamental ontology of QG, thereby conflicting with—rather than elucidating—spacetime emergence. In this paper, I show how to resolve the collapse problem. The solution is to draw on an existing distinction between physical and metaphysical notions of (relative) fundamentality. Using this distinction, we can see that spacetime functionalism does not after all force spacetime into the (more) fundamental ontology of QG in any troubling sense. Along the way, I suggest how to extend this solution to similar collapse problems in other domains.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
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      src: R
    language: English
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