Mental Simulation: From Neural Resemblance to Representation.
This paper argues that the key distinguishing feature between simulation and mere resemblance lies in its representational function. Defining this function requires addressing two critical conditions: how neural resemblance denotes its object and how specific content is grounded in such resemblance...
| Publicado en: | Erkenntnis Vol. 90; no. 8; pp. 3709 - 3730 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Dec2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=190357315&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 190357315 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01650106 5KZ jtl: Erkenntnis issn: 01650106 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2025 vid: 90 iid: 8 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 190357315 10.1007/s10670-024-00868-7 ppf: 3709 ppct: 21 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 633KB tig: atl: Mental Simulation: From Neural Resemblance to Representation. aug: au: Yousefi Heris, Ali affil: https://ror.org/0091vmj44 Department of Philosophy, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran su: Representation (Philosophy) Mental representation Cognitive ability Resemblance (Philosophy) Similarity (Psychology) sug: subj: Representation (Philosophy) Mental representation Cognitive ability Resemblance (Philosophy) Similarity (Psychology) keyword: Psychology and Cognitive Sciences Psychology ab: This paper argues that the key distinguishing feature between simulation and mere resemblance lies in its representational function. Defining this function requires addressing two critical conditions: how neural resemblance denotes its object and how specific content is grounded in such resemblance when it functions as representation. To begin with, the paper posits that the object of simulation is determined by its cognitive role within a broader cognitive system. Second, it examines three potential frameworks for grounding the content of simulation: the Neural Correspondence Thesis (NCT), the Functional Correspondence Thesis (FCT), and the Context-Dependent Correspondence Thesis (CDCT). Both NCT and FCT, the paper shows, encounter problems of content indeterminacy because of their oversimplified assumptions about the relationship between neural activations and mental states. FCT, in particular, faces the issue of over-permissiveness, wherein multiple neural activation patterns correspond to the same mental state, undermining the connection between functional roles and specific content. In response, the paper introduces CDCT as a more robust replacement, addressing both content indeterminacy and over-permissiveness by incorporating context-sensitive mappings between neural states and mental content. Drawing an analogy from the idea of cognitive maps in rats, the paper demonstrates how CDCT clarifies the role of context in shaping the mapping between neural activations and mental content, thereby offering a more precise framework for tackling the complexities of content determination in mental simulations. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Erkenntnis is a copyright of Springer, 2025. All Rights Reserved. item: Erkenntnis holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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