Artworks or Aesthetic Objects? Applying Kendall Walton's Normative Thesis to AICAN-generated Digital Objects.
This paper examines the philosophical implications of AI-generated digital objects in artistic institutions, focusing on Ahmed Elgammal's (2017) study, which assumes that aesthetic appeal, novelty, and indistinguishability from human-made artworks suffice to classify these objects as artworks. I cha...
| Publicado en: | Prolegomena: Journal of Philosophy Vol. 24; no. 2; pp. 315 - 342 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Society for the Advancement of Philosophy
2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=190674156&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 190674156 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 13334395 4UNN jtl: Prolegomena: Journal of Philosophy issn: 13334395 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: 2025 vid: 24 iid: 2 pid: 37835 pub: Society for the Advancement of Philosophy artinfo: ui: 190674156 10.26362/20250206 ppf: 315 ppct: 27 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 4.7MB tig: atl: Artworks or Aesthetic Objects? Applying Kendall Walton's Normative Thesis to AICAN-generated Digital Objects. aug: au: SAVČIĆ, KSENIJA affil: University of Rijeka, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Department of Philosophy, Sveučilišna avenija 4, 51000 Rijeka, Croatia su: Walton, Kendall L., 1939- Art labels Artificial intelligence Computer software Relativity sug: subj: Walton, Kendall L., 1939- Art labels Artificial intelligence Computer software Relativity keyword: Aesthetic objects aesthetic relativism AI-generated art AI-generirana umjetnost AICAN categories of art estetski objekti estetski relativizam kategorije umjetnosti Walton AI-generirana umjetnost estetski objekti estetski relativizam kategorije umjetnosti ab: This paper examines the philosophical implications of AI-generated digital objects in artistic institutions, focusing on Ahmed Elgammal's (2017) study, which assumes that aesthetic appeal, novelty, and indistinguishability from human-made artworks suffice to classify these objects as artworks. I challenge this tacit premise by arguing that AICAN-generated digital objects cannot be evaluated in the same way as human artworks because they lack extrinsic properties necessary for correct categorization. Drawing on Kendall Walton's Categories of Art (1970), I assert that truth and falsity apply to aesthetic judgments of artworks. I examine and defend Walton's requirements for the correct categorization of artworks against relevant objections. I proceed by applying Walton's requirements to AICAN outputs. I argue that AICAN's digital objects fail to meet two crucial requirements for correct categorization. Thus, their aesthetic properties necessarily remain category-relative, exposing artistic practice to radical relativism in aesthetic judgment. I contend that Walton's distinction between aesthetic objects and artworks provides a plausible framework for understanding AICAN's outputs and the aesthetic response they elicit. Accordingly, I argue that AICAN digital objects should be regarded as aesthetic objects rather than artworks. Ovaj rad razmatra filozofske implikacije digitalnih objekata generiranih umjetnom inteligencijom u umjetničkim institucijama, s posebnim naglaskom na studiju Ahmeda Elgammala (2017), koja pretpostavlja da su estetska privlačnost, novost i nerazlučivost od ljudski proizvedenih umjetničkih djela dostatni da bi se ti objekti svrstali među umjetnička djela. Dovodim u pitanje tu prešutnu pretpostavku tvrdeći da se digitalni objekti generirani AICAN-om ne mogu vrednovati na isti način kao ljudska umjetnička djela jer im nedostaju ekstrinzična svojstva nužna za ispravnu kategorizaciju. Oslanjajući se na djelo Kendalla Waltona Categories of Art (1970), tvrdim da se istinitost i neistinitost mogu primijeniti na estetske sudove o umjetničkim djelima. Istražujem i branim Waltonove zahtjeve za ispravnu kategorizaciju umjetničkih djela odgovarajući na relevantne prigovore. Zatim primjenjujem Waltonove zahtjeve na AICAN-ove rezultate. Tvrdim da digitalni objekti koje generira AICAN ne zadovoljavaju dva ključna zahtjeva za ispravnu kategorizaciju. Stoga njihova estetska svojstva nužno ostaju relativna prema kategoriji, izlažući umjetničku praksu radikalnom relativizmu estetskoga prosuđivanja. Smatram da Waltonovo razlikovanje estetskih objekata i umjetničkih djela pruža uvjerljiv okvir za razumijevanje AICAN-ovih rezultata i estetske reakcije koju izazivaju. U skladu s tim tvrdim da se digitalni objekti generirani AICAN-om trebaju smatrati estetskim objektima, a ne umjetničkim djelima. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Prolegomena: Journal of Philosophy is the property of Society for the Advancement of Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Prolegomena: Journal of Philosophy holder: Society for the Advancement of Philosophy dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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