Might Technology Undermine First-Person Authority?
The paper focuses on self-knowledge of attitudes like belief, desire, and intention. It motivates a constraint on when it is rational to treat a source as an authority. Then, drawing on the "transparency" of belief and other attitudes, it argues that the constraint is not satisfied in the case of kn...
| Publicado en: | Erkenntnis Vol. 91; no. 1; pp. 81 - 102 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Jan2026
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=190712020&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 190712020 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01650106 5KZ jtl: Erkenntnis issn: 01650106 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jan2026 vid: 91 iid: 1 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 190712020 10.1007/s10670-024-00876-7 ppf: 81 ppct: 21 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 683KB tig: atl: Might Technology Undermine First-Person Authority? aug: au: Doyle, Casey affil: https://ror.org/008rmbt77 Binghamton University, Binghamton, USA su: Theory of self-knowledge Artificial intelligence Intention Other (Philosophy) Expertise Desire Trust sug: subj: Theory of self-knowledge Artificial intelligence Intention Other (Philosophy) Expertise Desire Trust ab: The paper focuses on self-knowledge of attitudes like belief, desire, and intention. It motivates a constraint on when it is rational to treat a source as an authority. Then, drawing on the "transparency" of belief and other attitudes, it argues that the constraint is not satisfied in the case of knowing one's own mind by relying on AI or any other technology. Against some AI optimists, the paper argues that there are principled reasons why the task of knowing one's mind should not be outsourced to computers. Neither is AI a threat to the practice of deferring to avowing subjects. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Erkenntnis is a copyright of Springer, 2026. All Rights Reserved. item: Erkenntnis holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2026 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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