Strategic cyberwarfare.

This paper develops a theoretical model of cyberwarfare between nations, focusing on the factors that determine the severity and outcomes of cyber conflicts. We introduce a two‐country model where nations invest in offensive or defensive cyber capabilities across networked systems. We show that reso...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Published in:Economic Inquiry Vol. 64; no. 1; pp. 221 - 245
Main Authors: Lillethun, Erik, Sharma, Rishi
Format: Article
Published: Wiley-Blackwell Jan2026
Subjects:
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
fields @attributes:
  recordID: 1
pdfLink:
plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=190789060&site=ehost-live
header:
  @attributes:
    shortDbName: ssf
    uiTerm: 190789060
    longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson)
    uiTag: AN
  controlInfo:
    bkinfo:
    jinfo:
      jid:
        00952583
        EIQ
      jtl: Economic Inquiry
      issn: 00952583
      maglogo: Y
    pubinfo:
      dt: Jan2026
      vid: 64
      iid: 1
      pid: 480
      pub: Wiley-Blackwell
    artinfo:
      ui:
        190789060
        10.1111/ecin.70027
      ppf: 221
      ppct: 24
      formats:
      tig:
        atl: Strategic cyberwarfare.
      aug:
        au:
          Lillethun, Erik
          Sharma, Rishi
        affil: Department of Economics, Colgate University, Hamilton New York, , USA
      su:
        Cyberspace operations (Military science)
        Computer network security
        Internet security
      sug:
        subj:
          Wired Telecommunications Carriers
          Internet Publishing and Broadcasting and Web Search Portals
          Cyberspace operations (Military science)
          Computer network security
          Internet security
      keyword:
        conflict
        cyber
        game theory
        networks
        conflict
        cyber
        game theory
        networks
      ab: This paper develops a theoretical model of cyberwarfare between nations, focusing on the factors that determine the severity and outcomes of cyber conflicts. We introduce a two‐country model where nations invest in offensive or defensive cyber capabilities across networked systems. We show that resource expenditure intensifies when players' effective values are similar, which can help explain the rise of cyberwarfare. We explore the implications of network structures, showing how larger attack surfaces worsen outcomes for defenders. Additionally, we investigate the impact of private cyber defence provision, and find that centralized policies may either improve or exacerbate cyber conflict.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
    refInfo:
    copyright:
      @attributes:
        flag: N
    holdings:
      @attributes:
        islocal: N