Čapek's Argument for the Reality of Temporal Passage.
The antirealist position on temporal passage is that time exists but does not pass. Antirealists either claim that experiences of passage represent something that does not exist or that these experiences do not represent passage. This paper reconstructs and defends an argument for the reality of pas...
| Publicado en: | Erkenntnis Vol. 91; no. 2; pp. 689 - 702 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Feb2026
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=190855908&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 190855908 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01650106 5KZ jtl: Erkenntnis issn: 01650106 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Feb2026 vid: 91 iid: 2 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 190855908 10.1007/s10670-025-00922-y ppf: 689 ppct: 13 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 633KB tig: atl: Čapek's Argument for the Reality of Temporal Passage. aug: au: Kügler, Peter affil: https://ror.org/054pv6659 Department of Philosophy, University of Innsbruck, Innrain 52d, 6020, Innsbruck, Austria su: Time Mind & body Materialism Cognitive psychology Awareness Perceptual illusions Subjectivity Philosophers sug: subj: Time Mind & body Materialism Cognitive psychology Awareness Perceptual illusions Subjectivity Philosophers ab: The antirealist position on temporal passage is that time exists but does not pass. Antirealists either claim that experiences of passage represent something that does not exist or that these experiences do not represent passage. This paper reconstructs and defends an argument for the reality of passage by Milič Čapek that is based on the idea of mental passage, the passage of experience itself. The belief that mental passage exists is introspectively justified. This justification is not undermined by perceptual illusions and is also compatible with antirealist explanations of why the belief arises. Both physicalism and psychophysical dualism justify the premise that mental passage implies physical passage. Arguments by Huw Price and Simon Prosser purport to show that experiences do not represent physical passage. However, these arguments rely on thought experiments that presuppose the non-existence of mental passage, and therefore miss the fact that mental passage enables the representation of physical passage. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Erkenntnis is a copyright of Springer, 2026. All Rights Reserved. item: Erkenntnis holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2026 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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