Eliminativism Redux: Are Quotidian Pains Hurting Science?
Scientific inquiry has revealed that pain is a complex and heterogonous phenomenon that is neither localized to a circumscribed region in the brain nor realized by a unique neurological mechanism. This discovery has inspired the application of a new version of eliminativism–scientific eliminativism–...
| Publicado en: | Erkenntnis Vol. 91; no. 2; pp. 853 - 875 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Feb2026
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=190855911&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 190855911 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01650106 5KZ jtl: Erkenntnis issn: 01650106 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Feb2026 vid: 91 iid: 2 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 190855911 10.1007/s10670-025-00931-x ppf: 853 ppct: 22 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 663KB tig: atl: Eliminativism Redux: Are Quotidian Pains Hurting Science? aug: au: Gligorov, Nada affil: https://ror.org/03g66yt05 Alden March Bioethics Institute at Albany Medical College, 47 New Scotland Ave, MC 153, 12208, Albany, NY, USA su: Pain perception Philosophy of science Psychology Brain physiology Scientific method Suffering sug: subj: Pain perception Philosophy of science Psychology Brain physiology Scientific method Suffering keyword: Medical and Health Sciences Neurosciences ab: Scientific inquiry has revealed that pain is a complex and heterogonous phenomenon that is neither localized to a circumscribed region in the brain nor realized by a unique neurological mechanism. This discovery has inspired the application of a new version of eliminativism–scientific eliminativism–to pain. Based on this view, pain is not a natural kind and should be eliminated from scientific theorizing. Scientific eliminativism applied to pain is purportedly distinct from eliminative materialism because the former does not require elimination of the term 'pain' from its quotidian uses in folk psychology. In this paper, I challenge the distinction between scientific eliminativism and eliminative materialism and argue that the two versions of eliminativism make the same claims. I argue further that endorsement of scientific eliminativism for pain leads to elimination of the category of pain from folk psychology. To avoid this outcome, I formulate a proposal that obviates the need for eliminativism in any domain. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Erkenntnis is a copyright of Springer, 2026. All Rights Reserved. item: Erkenntnis holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2026 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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