The Virtual isn't Real.
The suggestion that we might live in a giant computer simulation seems plausible in large part because the hypothetical sophistication of the hypothetical simulation can be increased to meet almost any objection. From an engineering standpoint, the technological increases required by this strategy m...
| Publicado en: | Disputatio: International Journal of Philosophy Vol. 16; no. 72; pp. 37 - 67 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Paradigm Publishing Services
May2024
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=191009210&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 191009210 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 0873626X 1CM2 jtl: Disputatio: International Journal of Philosophy issn: 0873626X maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: May2024 vid: 16 iid: 72 pid: 35924 pub: Paradigm Publishing Services artinfo: ui: 191009210 10.2478/disp-2024-0003 ppf: 37 ppct: 30 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 273KB tig: atl: The Virtual isn't Real. aug: au: Champagne, Marc affil: Kwantlen Polytechnic University su: Virtual reality Chalmers, David Philosophers Computer simulation Disjunction (Logic) sug: subj: Virtual reality Chalmers, David Philosophers Computer simulation Disjunction (Logic) keyword: disjunctivism embodiment pragmaticism simulation argument virtual reality ab: The suggestion that we might live in a giant computer simulation seems plausible in large part because the hypothetical sophistication of the hypothetical simulation can be increased to meet almost any objection. From an engineering standpoint, the technological increases required by this strategy may not always be feasible. Proceeding nevertheless from an idealization, David Chalmers argues that the virtual objects and worlds displayed in perfect and permanent computer simulations could be regarded as real because, on those terms (perfection and permanence), our own world could just as well be virtual. I counter that real reality, or RR, possesses (at least) five features that no VR simulation could ever reproduce: RR involves genuinely causal regularities, it is older than any machine, it will outlast any machine, it supports living bodies in ways that cannot be replaced, and thus belongs to an entirely different category than artifacts. These differences are especially robust, since they all grant the possibility of present-moment indistinguishability while halting any collapse or blurring of the virtual/real distinction. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Disputatio: International Journal of Philosophy is the property of Paradigm Publishing Services and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Disputatio: International Journal of Philosophy holder: Paradigm Publishing Services dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|