Politician–manager relationship, procurement decisions, and corruption risk in local governments.

This study combines agency and patronage theories to explore how the nature of local governing bodies – elected politicians or centrally appointed commissioners – influences managerial decisions and related corruption risks in public procurement. Agency theory suggests that discretion and weak overs...

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Detalles Bibliográficos

Publicado en:	Local Government Studies Vol. 52; no. 1; pp. 124 - 148
Autores principales:	Mussari, Riccardo, Monteduro, Fabio, Caramia, Simona, Allegrini, Veronica
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	Taylor & Francis Ltd Feb2026
Materias:	Politicians Local government Political corruption Municipal government Public interest
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost