Expecting the Next Coup? The Unchallenged Brazilian Military's Bargaining Power.
The civil‐military relations in Brazil have faced criticism due to weak political institutions and significant military autonomy, resulting in a regression of democratisation. This article posits that the shortcomings in Brazilian civil‐military relations have historical roots, with military preroga...
| Publicado en: | Bulletin of Latin American Research Vol. 45; no. 1; pp. 1 - 15 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jan2026
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=191072687&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 191072687 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 02613050 BLA jtl: Bulletin of Latin American Research issn: 02613050 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jan2026 vid: 45 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 191072687 10.1111/blar.70036 ppf: 1 ppct: 14 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 704KB tig: atl: Expecting the Next Coup? The Unchallenged Brazilian Military's Bargaining Power. aug: au: Duarte, Érico Esteves affil: Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, , Brazil su: Civil-military relations Bargaining power Democratization Royal prerogative Brazil sug: subj: Brazil Civil-military relations Bargaining power Democratization Royal prerogative keyword: armed forces civilian‐military relations defence policy democracy military coup ab: The civil‐military relations in Brazil have faced criticism due to weak political institutions and significant military autonomy, resulting in a regression of democratisation. This article posits that the shortcomings in Brazilian civil‐military relations have historical roots, with military prerogatives established in the early twentieth century and largely unopposed since that time. The military's robust corporate identity and its pivotal role in public administration and policy have granted it significant bargaining power, enabling resistance to reforms and undermining civilian authority. This paper provides evidence indicating that elected Brazilian administrations since 1995, particularly during Silva (2003–2011, 2023–) and Rousseff (2011–2016) administration, have significantly militarised the defence decision‐making process and increased the involvement of the armed forces in public security, infrastructure development and public administration. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Bulletin of Latin American Research is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Bulletin of Latin American Research holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2026 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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