Predictive processing's flirt with transcendental idealism.
The popular predictive processing (PP) framework posits prediction error minimization (PEM) as the sole mechanism in the brain that can account for all mental phenomena, including consciousness. I first highlight three ambitions associated with major presentations of PP: (1) Completeness (PP aims fo...
| Published in: | Nous (0029-4624) Vol. 60; no. 1; pp. 87 - 110 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Mar2026
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=191298368&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 191298368 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00294624 D97 jtl: Nous (0029-4624) issn: 00294624 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Mar2026 vid: 60 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 191298368 10.1111/nous.12552 ppf: 87 ppct: 23 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 265KB tig: atl: Predictive processing's flirt with transcendental idealism. aug: au: Schlicht, Tobias affil: Institute of Philosophy II, Ruhr‐Universität Bochum, Bochum, Germany su: Naturalism Consciousness Cognition Prediction models Cognitive psychology Transcendentalism (Philosophy) sug: subj: Naturalism Consciousness Cognition Prediction models Cognitive psychology Transcendentalism (Philosophy) ab: The popular predictive processing (PP) framework posits prediction error minimization (PEM) as the sole mechanism in the brain that can account for all mental phenomena, including consciousness. I first highlight three ambitions associated with major presentations of PP: (1) Completeness (PP aims for a comprehensive account of mental phenomena), (2) Bayesian realism (PP claims that PEM is implemented in the brain rather than providing only a model), and (3) Naturalism (PP is typically presented as yielding a naturalistic view of the mind). Then I demonstrate that many proponents of PP also endorse a form of Kantian transcendental idealism (TI), based on a characterization of experiential content as the brain's currently best hypothesis about the world. I argue that endorsing this claim (4), that is, that we only experience the world as it appears, but not the world itself, sabotages achieving the three ambitions. The argument proceeds by discussing the prospects of each ambition in turn, drawing on discussions in the philosophy of science about realism and its alternatives, about the motivation and features of computational models, and about the foundational role of consciousness for science. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Nous (0029-4624) is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Nous (0029-4624) holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2026 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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