Perceptual abstraction.
Perception puts us in touch with highly determinate properties of objects, such as fine‐grained color shades and detailed surface shapes. However, most of our immediate perceptual judgments concern more abstract properties, such as the property of being a dog, or of being red simpliciter. So, how do...
| Publicado en: | Nous (0029-4624) Vol. 60; no. 1; pp. 161 - 194 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Mar2026
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=191298372&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 191298372 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00294624 D97 jtl: Nous (0029-4624) issn: 00294624 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Mar2026 vid: 60 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 191298372 10.1111/nous.70001 ppf: 161 ppct: 33 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 650KB tig: atl: Perceptual abstraction. aug: au: Westfall, Mason Green, E. J. affil: William H. Miller III Department of Philosophy, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore Maryland, , USA su: Visual perception Conceptualism Scientific observation Perceptual learning Conceptual structures Attention sug: subj: Visual perception Conceptualism Scientific observation Perceptual learning Conceptual structures Attention ab: Perception puts us in touch with highly determinate properties of objects, such as fine‐grained color shades and detailed surface shapes. However, most of our immediate perceptual judgments concern more abstract properties, such as the property of being a dog, or of being red simpliciter. So, how does perception attune us to abstract properties despite its evident determinacy? This paper argues that perception can be sensitive to abstract properties in multiple, fundamentally different ways. We articulate a distinction between implicit and explicit perceptual abstraction and explore its ramifications for debates about the role of concepts in perception, the richness of perceptual content, and rationalist versus empiricist views of our innate representational repertoire. We also propose an empirical test for differentiating implicit from explicit perceptual abstraction. Finally, we outline a version of Conceptualism built on the implicit/explicit distinction, on which explicit perceptual abstraction involves the use of concepts, while implicit abstraction can occur non‐conceptually. We argue that this form of Conceptualism is both empirically viable and unscathed by prominent Non‐Conceptualist arguments. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Nous (0029-4624) is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Nous (0029-4624) holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2026 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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