The Virtual as Personal.
In this paper, I examine the implications of Chalmers' [2017, 2019] digital realism on personal identity, building on Floridi's [2014] onlife concept and supporting the idea that persons extend in biological and virtual realms. By positing the physical existence of virtual entities within computer s...
| Publicado en: | Disputatio: International Journal of Philosophy Vol. 16; no. 74; pp. 197 - 216 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Paradigm Publishing Services
Dec2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=191335543&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 191335543 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 0873626X 1CM2 jtl: Disputatio: International Journal of Philosophy issn: 0873626X maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2024 vid: 16 iid: 74 pid: 35924 pub: Paradigm Publishing Services artinfo: ui: 191335543 10.2478/disp-2024-0010 ppf: 197 ppct: 19 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 122KB tig: atl: The Virtual as Personal. aug: au: Patrone, Fabio affil: FISPPA, University of Padua su: Self Computer systems Virtual reality Digital technology sug: subj: Self Computer systems Virtual reality Digital technology keyword: digital realism persistence personal identity temporal parts virtual reality ab: In this paper, I examine the implications of Chalmers' [2017, 2019] digital realism on personal identity, building on Floridi's [2014] onlife concept and supporting the idea that persons extend in biological and virtual realms. By positing the physical existence of virtual entities within computer systems, digital realism suggests a relationship between individuals and their digital counterparts akin to that between two physical entities. I argue that fourdimensionalism, which conceives of objects as composed of temporal parts, offers a robust framework for understanding this relationship. By treating virtual entities as aggregates of virtual temporal parts, this framework brings two theoretical advancements. First, we would be able to account for the apparent paradox of simultaneous existence in biological and virtual spaces. Second, by maintaining the theoretical framework of digital realism, we can provide an account of personal identity that adequately captures the increasingly intimate relationship between ourselves and our digital counterparts. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Disputatio: International Journal of Philosophy is the property of Paradigm Publishing Services and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Disputatio: International Journal of Philosophy holder: Paradigm Publishing Services dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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