FORMS OF LIFE, NOT FUNCTIONS: ETHICS, EVALUATION, AND THE LIMITS OF BENCHMARKING IN AI.
Benchmark-driven approaches to AI ethics increasingly dominate efforts to evaluate artificial systems deployed in socially sensitive domains such as healthcare, education, and criminal justice. By translating complex moral values – like fairness, accountability, or transparency – into quantifiable p...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Alternatives Journal / Filosofski Alternativi Vol. 35; no. 1; pp. 14 - 32 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Institute of Philosophical Research
2026
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=191562298&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 191562298 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 08617899 3BV5 jtl: Philosophical Alternatives Journal / Filosofski Alternativi issn: 08617899 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: 2026 vid: 35 iid: 1 pid: 35902 pub: Institute of Philosophical Research artinfo: ui: 191562298 10.58945/HSPV4476 ppf: 14 ppct: 18 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 919KB tig: atl: FORMS OF LIFE, NOT FUNCTIONS: ETHICS, EVALUATION, AND THE LIMITS OF BENCHMARKING IN AI. aug: au: SIMION, RADU affil: Assoc. Prof. (PhD) at the Babeş-Bolyai" University, Cluj-Napoca (Faculty of History and Philosophy), Romania. su: Artificial intelligence & ethics Benchmarking (Management) Moral foundations theory Philosophy of language Moral reasoning Normativity (Ethics) Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951 sug: subj: Artificial intelligence & ethics Benchmarking (Management) Moral foundations theory Philosophy of language Moral reasoning Normativity (Ethics) Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951 keyword: AI ethics benchmarking computational ethics moral epistemology normativity Wittgenstein Витгенщайн етика на изкуствения интелект компютърна етика морална епистемология нормативност сравнителен анализ ab: Benchmark-driven approaches to AI ethics increasingly dominate efforts to evaluate artificial systems deployed in socially sensitive domains such as healthcare, education, and criminal justice. By translating complex moral values – like fairness, accountability, or transparency – into quantifiable proxies, benchmarking seeks to deliver clarity, standardization, and comparability. Yet this process risks reducing normativity to measurable outputs, stripping ethics of its contextual, interpretive, and contested character. In response, this paper offers a philosophical intervention grounded in the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Rather than advancing a prescriptive ethical model, it pursues conceptual clarification, challenging the presumption that moral reasoning can be formalized, abstracted, and rendered computationally tractable. From a Wittgensteinian perspective, ethics is not reducible to algorithmic compliance or rule-following, but is best understood as a grammar of practice embedded in language, interaction, and institutional contexts. Benchmarking emerges here not merely as a limited tool, but as a symptom of deeper philosophical misapprehensions – attempts to impose formal closure on normative ambiguity. To move beyond this reductionism, the paper calls for a reorientation toward what it terms "ethical infrastructures": situated, participatory, and reflexive processes that enable moral reflection and accountability across diverse sociotechnical settings. The central question thus shifts from how to measure ethical AI to how ethical meaning is negotiated, sustained, and challenged in practice. Reframed in this way, ethics becomes less about computational alignment and more about sustaining the conditions under which moral reasoning remains plural, situated, and publicly contestable. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophical Alternatives Journal / Filosofski Alternativi is the property of Institute of Philosophical Research and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophical Alternatives Journal / Filosofski Alternativi holder: Institute of Philosophical Research dt: @attributes: year: 2026 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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