The Integrated Information Theory Needs Attention.
The Integrated Information Theory (IIT) might be our current best bet at a scientific explanation of phenomenal consciousness. IIT focuses on the distinctively subjective and phenomenological aspects of conscious experience. Currently, it offers the fundaments of a formal account, but future develop...
| Publicado en: | Erkenntnis Vol. 91; no. 3; pp. 1419 - 1444 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Mar2026
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=191693404&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 191693404 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01650106 5KZ jtl: Erkenntnis issn: 01650106 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Mar2026 vid: 91 iid: 3 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 191693404 10.1007/s10670-025-00949-1 ppf: 1419 ppct: 25 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.8MB tig: atl: The Integrated Information Theory Needs Attention. aug: au: Lopez, Azenet Montemayor, Carlos affil: https://ror.org/05591te55 Chair of Philosophy of Mind, Ludwig Maximilian Universität München, Munich, Germany https://ror.org/05ykr0121 Department of Philosophy, San Francisco State University, San Francisco, USA su: Attention Consciousness Philosophy of mind Structuralism Phenomenology sug: subj: Attention Consciousness Philosophy of mind Structuralism Phenomenology keyword: Philosophy and Religious Studies Philosophy ab: The Integrated Information Theory (IIT) might be our current best bet at a scientific explanation of phenomenal consciousness. IIT focuses on the distinctively subjective and phenomenological aspects of conscious experience. Currently, it offers the fundaments of a formal account, but future developments shall explain the qualitative structures of every possible conscious experience. But this ambitious project is hindered by one fundamental limitation. IIT fails to acknowledge the crucial roles of attention in generating phenomenally conscious experience and shaping its contents. Here, we argue that IIT urgently needs an account of attention. Without this account, IIT cannot explain important informational differences between different kinds of experiences. Furthermore, though some IIT proponents celebratedly endorse a double dissociation between consciousness and attention, close analysis reveals that such as dissociation is in fact incompatible with IIT. Notably, the issues we raise for IIT will likely arise for many internalist theories of conscious contents in philosophy, especially theories with primitivist inclinations. Our arguments also extend to the recently popularized structuralist approaches. Overall, our discussion highlights how considerations about attention are indispensable for scientific as well as philosophical theorizing about conscious experience. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Erkenntnis is a copyright of Springer, 2026. All Rights Reserved. item: Erkenntnis holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2026 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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