Manipulating belief partially remedies the metamemory expectancy illusion in schema-based source monitoring.

Metamemory illusions (i.e., false predictions of memory) are thought to arise from false a priori beliefs or from experiences made during study, such as processing fluency. The aim of the current research was to isolate the contribution of belief to metamemory by testing whether a correction of fals...

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Publicado en:Memory & Cognition Vol. 54; no. 2; pp. 401 - 420
Autores principales: Schaper, Marie Luisa, Bayen, Ute J.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Feb2026
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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      dt: Feb2026
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      pub: Springer Nature
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      aug:
        au:
          Schaper, Marie Luisa
          Bayen, Ute J.
        affil: https://ror.org/024z2rq82 Institute for Experimental Psychology, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf, Germany
      su:
        Germany
        Episodic memory
        Perceptual illusions
        Randomized controlled trials
        Analysis of variance
        Psychology of college students
        Judgment (Psychology)
        Cognitive testing
        Research funding
        Statistical sampling
        Probability theory
        Object manipulation
        Descriptive statistics
        Experimental design
        Schema therapy
        Comparative studies
        Data analysis software
        Confidence intervals
      sug:
        subj:
          Episodic memory
          Perceptual illusions
          Randomized controlled trials
          Analysis of variance
          Psychology of college students
          Judgment (Psychology)
          Germany
          Marketing Research and Public Opinion Polling
          Cognitive testing
          Research funding
          Statistical sampling
          Probability theory
          Object manipulation
          Descriptive statistics
          Experimental design
          Schema therapy
          Comparative studies
          Data analysis software
          Confidence intervals
      keyword:
        Belief
        Judgments of source
        Metamemory
        Psychology and Cognitive Sciences Psychology
        Schemas
        Source monitoring
        Belief
        Judgments of source
        Metamemory
        Psychology and Cognitive Sciences Psychology
        Schemas
        Source monitoring
      ab: Metamemory illusions (i.e., false predictions of memory) are thought to arise from false a priori beliefs or from experiences made during study, such as processing fluency. The aim of the current research was to isolate the contribution of belief to metamemory by testing whether a correction of false beliefs can remedy a metamemory illusion. The authors focus on schema-based source monitoring, in which people show a metamemory expectancy illusion (e.g., Schaper et al., Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 45(3), 470–496, 2019a). At study, people predict better source memory for items from expected sources (e.g., toothbrush in a bathroom), whereas actual source memory is better for items from unexpected sources (e.g., shampoo in a kitchen) or unaffected by expectations. In two source-monitoring experiments (N = 120/121), the authors tested whether the expectancy illusion could be remedied by correcting a priori belief. Participants studied items from expected and unexpected sources and made item-wise metamemory predictions about source memory. In both experiments, a manipulation to correct belief attenuated the expectancy illusion compared to a control group, but not to full remedy. Experiment 2 further revealed two distinct theoretical mechanisms underlying the partial persistence of the metamemory illusion: A partial inferential deficit, indicated by some participants failing to correct their belief, and a partial utilization deficit, indicated by participants failing to adequately use a corrected belief in metamemory judgments. The authors discuss competing influences of beliefs and experiences in metamemory judgment formation.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
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