Is nondomination a social ideal?

According to a prominent strain of thought in the republican tradition, nondomination is a social ideal, in the sense that it can be enjoyed only by living in the right sort of political community with others, rather than by simply withdrawing from others altogether. This understanding has important...

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Publicado en:Southern Journal of Philosophy Vol. 64; no. 1; pp. 71 - 85
Autor principal: MacRae, Callum Zavos
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Mar2026
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Is nondomination a social ideal?
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        au: MacRae, Callum Zavos
        affil: Interdisciplinary Centre for Ethics, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland
      su:
        Political community
        Equality
        Liberty
        Republicanism
        Political science
        Social values
        Social stratification
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          Political community
          Equality
          Liberty
          Republicanism
          Political science
          Social values
          Social stratification
      ab: According to a prominent strain of thought in the republican tradition, nondomination is a social ideal, in the sense that it can be enjoyed only by living in the right sort of political community with others, rather than by simply withdrawing from others altogether. This understanding has important ramifications for the way that we see nondomination's connections with other important concepts in political philosophy, such as community and independence. In this article, I argue that whether or not nondomination is a social value in this way depends upon the underlying grounds of our commitment to the ideal of nondomination. Consequently, whether or not nondomination is related to ideals like community and independence in the ways that many theorists have claimed depends upon those underlying grounds in the same way. In particular, I distinguish three different ideals of nondomination: one grounded on freedom as avoiding arbitrary dependence, one grounded on avoiding relations of inequality, and one grounded on achieving relations of equality. I argue that only the latter of these is well understood as a social ideal. I conclude with some thoughts about the implications of this argument for domination theory and its role in political philosophy.
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