Why civilians don't defer to military preferences about cyber strategy like they do for other domains.
Do civilians defer to military preferences about U.S. cyber strategy? The civil-military relations literature has only cursorily addressed this question. This article aims to fill this gap. I argue that three factors affect the prospects of civilian deference: secrecy, the relative bureaucratic powe...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 48; no. 6/7; pp. 1280 - 1323 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
Dec2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=192252970&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 192252970 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01402390 IY9 jtl: Journal of Strategic Studies issn: 01402390 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2025 vid: 48 iid: 6/7 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 192252970 10.1080/01402390.2025.2531792 ppf: 1280 ppct: 43 formats: tig: atl: Why civilians don't defer to military preferences about cyber strategy like they do for other domains. aug: au: Lonergan, Erica D. affil: School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University, New York, NY, USA su: Civil-military relations United States. Strategic Command (2002- ). Cyber Command Computer network security Rational-legal authority Cyberspace operations (Military science) Information warfare Military policy United States sug: subj: United States Civil-military relations United States. Strategic Command (2002- ). Cyber Command Computer network security Rational-legal authority Cyberspace operations (Military science) Information warfare Military policy keyword: civil-military relations cyber strategy Cybersecurity military strategy U.S. Cyber Command ab: Do civilians defer to military preferences about U.S. cyber strategy? The civil-military relations literature has only cursorily addressed this question. This article aims to fill this gap. I argue that three factors affect the prospects of civilian deference: secrecy, the relative bureaucratic power of U.S. Cyber Command, and the influence of civilian industry. Taken together, these factors make civilians less likely to excessively defer to the military. I examine more than a decade of strategy, doctrine, and public discourse among U.S. civilian and military leaders about military cyber power, and find limited evidence of excessive civilian deference. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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