Auctions with Frictions: Recruitment, Entry, and Limited Commitment.
Auction models are convenient abstractions of informal price-formation processes that arise in markets for assets or services. These processes involve frictions like bidder recruitment costs for sellers, participation costs for bidders, and limitations on sellers' commitment abilities. This paper de...
| Publicado en: | Review of Economic Studies Vol. 93; no. 2; pp. 1167 - 1200 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Mar2026
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=192334030&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 192334030 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00346527 REM jtl: Review of Economic Studies issn: 00346527 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Mar2026 vid: 93 iid: 2 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 192334030 10.1093/restud/rdaf052 ppf: 1167 ppct: 33 formats: tig: atl: Auctions with Frictions: Recruitment, Entry, and Limited Commitment. aug: au: Lauermann, Stephan Wolinsky, Asher affil: Department of Economics, The University of Bonn, Germany Department of Economics, Northwestern University, USA su: Economic competition Cost Auctions Transaction costs Economic efficiency Bidders Market prices sug: subj: Economic competition Cost Auctions Transaction costs Economic efficiency Bidders Market prices keyword: Bargaining copyrightHolder:Review of Economic Studies Ltd copyrightYear:2026 inLanguage:en publisher:Oxford University Press sameAs:https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdaf052 Search Bargaining copyrightHolder:Review of Economic Studies Ltd copyrightYear:2026 inLanguage:en publisher:Oxford University Press sameAs:https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdaf052 Search ab: Auction models are convenient abstractions of informal price-formation processes that arise in markets for assets or services. These processes involve frictions like bidder recruitment costs for sellers, participation costs for bidders, and limitations on sellers' commitment abilities. This paper develops an auction model that captures such frictions. We derive novel insights, notably that outcomes are often inefficient, that markets sometimes unravel, and that the observability of competition may have a large effect. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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