Community Enforcement with Endogenous Records.
I study repeated games with anonymous random matching where players can add or remove signals from their records. The ability to manipulate records introduces monotonicity constraints on players' continuation values, under which sufficiently long-lived players will almost never cooperate. When playe...
| Publicado en: | Review of Economic Studies Vol. 93; no. 2; pp. 1241 - 1261 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Mar2026
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=192334032&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 192334032 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00346527 REM jtl: Review of Economic Studies issn: 00346527 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Mar2026 vid: 93 iid: 2 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 192334032 10.1093/restud/rdaf049 ppf: 1241 ppct: 20 formats: tig: atl: Community Enforcement with Endogenous Records. aug: au: Pei, Harry affil: Northwestern University, USA su: Cooperation Game theory Repeated games (Game theory) sug: subj: Cooperation Game theory Repeated games (Game theory) keyword: Anti-folk theorem Community enforcement copyrightHolder:Review of Economic Studies Ltd copyrightYear:2026 Endogenous records Expected lifespan inLanguage:en publisher:Oxford University Press sameAs:https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdaf049 Anti-folk theorem Community enforcement copyrightHolder:Review of Economic Studies Ltd copyrightYear:2026 Endogenous records Expected lifespan inLanguage:en publisher:Oxford University Press sameAs:https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdaf049 ab: I study repeated games with anonymous random matching where players can add or remove signals from their records. The ability to manipulate records introduces monotonicity constraints on players' continuation values, under which sufficiently long-lived players will almost never cooperate. When players' expected lifespans are intermediate, their ability to sustain cooperation depends on (i) whether their actions are complements or substitutes and (ii) whether manipulation takes the form of adding or removing signals. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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