Search Direction: Position Externalities and Position Auction Bias.
We formulate a tractable model of pricing under directed search with heterogeneous firm demands. Demand characteristics drive bids in a position auction and enable us to bridge insights from the ordered search literature to those in the position auction literature. Equilibrium pricing implies that t...
| Publicado en: | Review of Economic Studies Vol. 93; no. 2; pp. 763 - 798 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Oxford University Press / USA
Mar2026
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=192334038&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 192334038 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00346527 REM jtl: Review of Economic Studies issn: 00346527 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Mar2026 vid: 93 iid: 2 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 192334038 10.1093/restud/rdaf051 ppf: 763 ppct: 35 formats: tig: atl: Search Direction: Position Externalities and Position Auction Bias. aug: au: Anderson, Simon P Renault, Régis affil: Department of Economics, University of Virginia and Center for Economic and Policy Research, University of Virginia, USA CY Cergy Paris Université, Thema, France su: Economic competition Auctions Bidding strategies Consumers' surplus Market equilibrium sug: subj: Economic competition Auctions Bidding strategies Consumers' surplus Market equilibrium keyword: copyrightHolder:Review of Economic Studies Ltd copyrightYear:2026 Generalized second price auction inLanguage:en Optimal and equilibrium Rankings Ordered search Position auction Position externalities Product heterogeneity publisher:Oxford University Press sameAs:https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdaf051 copyrightHolder:Review of Economic Studies Ltd copyrightYear:2026 Generalized second price auction inLanguage:en Optimal and equilibrium Rankings Ordered search Position auction Position externalities Product heterogeneity publisher:Oxford University Press sameAs:https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdaf051 ab: We formulate a tractable model of pricing under directed search with heterogeneous firm demands. Demand characteristics drive bids in a position auction and enable us to bridge insights from the ordered search literature to those in the position auction literature. Equilibrium pricing implies that the marginal consumer's surplus decreases down the search order, so consumers optimally follow the firms' position ordering. A firm suffers from "business stealing" by firms that precede it and "search appeal" from subsequent firms. We find rankings that achieve the maximal joint profit or consumer surplus by constructing firm-specific scores. A generalized second price auction for positions endogenizes equilibrium orders and bids are driven by position externalities that impact incremental profit from switching positions. The joint profit maximization order is upheld when firm heterogeneity concerns mostly their mark-up potentials. But the consumer welfare order is robust when firms differ mostly over their potential market sizes. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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