Pseudo Lindahl Equilibrium as a Collective Choice Rule.
A collective choice problem specifies a finite set of alternatives from which a group of expected utility maximizers must choose. We associate a collective pseudo market with every collective choice problem and establish the existence and efficiency of pseudo Lindahl equilibrium (PLE) allocations. W...
| Publicado en: | Review of Economic Studies Vol. 93; no. 2; pp. 938 - 968 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Mar2026
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=192334043&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 192334043 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00346527 REM jtl: Review of Economic Studies issn: 00346527 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Mar2026 vid: 93 iid: 2 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 192334043 10.1093/restud/rdaf043 ppf: 938 ppct: 30 formats: tig: atl: Pseudo Lindahl Equilibrium as a Collective Choice Rule. aug: au: Gul, Faruk Pesendorfer, Wolfgang affil: Princeton University, USA su: Nash, John F., 1928-2015 Social choice Negotiation Equilibrium sug: subj: Social choice Negotiation Equilibrium Nash, John F., 1928-2015 keyword: Bargaining theory copyrightHolder:Review of Economic Studies Ltd copyrightYear:2026 Discrete allocation problems inLanguage:en Lindahl equilibrium Pseudo markets publisher:Oxford University Press sameAs:https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdaf043 Bargaining theory copyrightHolder:Review of Economic Studies Ltd copyrightYear:2026 Discrete allocation problems inLanguage:en Lindahl equilibrium Pseudo markets publisher:Oxford University Press sameAs:https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdaf043 ab: A collective choice problem specifies a finite set of alternatives from which a group of expected utility maximizers must choose. We associate a collective pseudo market with every collective choice problem and establish the existence and efficiency of pseudo Lindahl equilibrium (PLE) allocations. We also associate a cooperative bargaining problem with every collective choice problem and define a set-valued solution concept, the ω - weighted Nash bargaining set where ω is a vector of welfare weights. We provide axioms that characterize the ω -weighted Nash bargaining set. Our main result shows that ω -weighted Nash bargaining set payoffs are also the PLE payoffs of the corresponding collective pseudo market with the same utility functions and incomes ω. We define a pseudo core for collective pseudo markets and show that pseudo Lindahl equilibria are in the pseudo core. We characterize the set of PLE outcomes of discrete allocation problems and show that they contain the set of pseudo Walrasian equilibrium outcomes. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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