Games on Multiplex Networks.

We develop a simple multilayer network model in which agents allocate effort across layers with heterogeneous structures, subject to an aggregate effort constraint. Incentives are shaped by agents' network positions within each layer, and equilibrium behavior reflects both within- and cross-layer in...

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Publicado en:American Economic Review Vol. 116; no. 4; pp. 1415 - 1459
Autores principales: Zenou, Yves, Zhou, Junjie
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: American Economic Association Apr2026
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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      dt: Apr2026
      vid: 116
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      pub: American Economic Association
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        10.1257/aer.20240763
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        atl: Games on Multiplex Networks.
      aug:
        au:
          Zenou, Yves
          Zhou, Junjie
        affil:
          Monash University
          Tsinghua University
      su:
        Resource allocation
        Policy sciences
        Computer networks
        Nash equilibrium
      sug:
        subj:
          Resource allocation
          Policy sciences
          Computer networks
          Computer Systems Design Services
          Nash equilibrium
      ab: We develop a simple multilayer network model in which agents allocate effort across layers with heterogeneous structures, subject to an aggregate effort constraint. Incentives are shaped by agents' network positions within each layer, and equilibrium behavior reflects both within- and cross-layer interactions. We analyze how shocks propagate through the network and characterize optimal targeting interventions. Our results show that effective policy design must account for effort allocation across layers. We also demonstrate that predictions from monolayer models can diverge sharply from those of multilayer models, underscoring the importance of accounting for network complexity in both empirical and policy analyses. (JEL C70, D78, D82, D85, H41, Z13)
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
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